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Environmental Law As Corporate
Law: Parent-Subsidiary Liability
Under CERCLA And The Kayser-
Roth Aftermath
I. INTRODUCTION
Disappointed by the lack of progress in cleaning up the
nation's nearly 50,000 hazardous waste sites,' Congress enacted
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)2 not only to increase the pace
of the process but to clarify the legal responsibilities of those
who should be punished. Section 107(a)(2) of the Act, for ex-
ample, provides that "any person who at the time of disposal
of hazardous substances owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of" will be liable for
any and all cleanup costs.3 Since CERCLA's inception, however,
at issue for most courts is deciding who should actually be made
to pay, with interpretations of "owned or operated" still a
mystery for many.4 The question remains: how far does CER-
CLA liability extend?5
I United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(suggesting 30,000 to 50,000 improperly managed sites).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).
1 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (emphasis added). The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") estimates clean up costs of $300 to $500 billion, excluding Department
of Energy sites. Office of Technology Assessment, Assessing Contractor Use in Super-
fund, 1, n.l (1989); see also United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D.
Colo. 1985) ($1.8 billion for 27 acre clean-up).
I Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) ("owner and operator") (emphasis added) with
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)("owner or operator") (emphasis added). For an analysis of this
discrepancy no court has accepted to date, see Charles E. Davidson, Corporate Own-
ership of Real Estate: The Impact of Environmental Legislation on Shareholder Liability,
17 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 311 (1989); see infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
I For example, one analyst concludes "efforts to predict when courts will or will
not impose liability in a corporate context result in little more than a roll of the dice."
John J. Little, Towards Respect For Corporate Separateness in Defining the Reach of
CERCLA Liability, 44 Sw. L. J. 1499, 1500 (1991). Another suggests "liability for
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Just over the last three years, several courts have addressed
CERCLA liability for parent corporations and their subsidiaries.
6
As explained in this Note, some courts seem to push for narrow
interpretations of CERCLA, allowing traditional corporate law
doctrines to prevail, while others apparently hold parent corpo-
rations liable for all environmental sins no matter what corporate
organization is in place. Still left unresolved by the courts is the
clash between the "language of the statute and the realities of
corporate existence." 7 The choice of theory is more than an
academic debate; one interpretation over another can push cor-
porations to the brink of financial disaster, or absolve them of
all responsibility for hazardous waste clean-up.' Concentrating
hazardous substance cleanups, like the flu, eventually seems to get around to everyone
with any contact with the infected site." Carolyn Rashby, United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co.: Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 14 ECOLOGY L. Q. 569, 570 (1987).
For other perspectives, see Tom McMahon & Katie Moertle, The Erosion of Traditional
Corporate Law Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & Erwvr. 29, 56
(1988) (holding corporation liable for subsidiary amounts to new and unforeseen expan-
sion of liability by the courts where corporate formalities have been met); and Jill E.
Aversa, Casenote, Liability of Responsible Parties for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: CER-
CLA Section 107 Liability After One Decade; 1 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 563, 579 (1990)
(ambiguous "owner or operator" definition with inconsistent court interpretations).
The most incisive analysis of CERCLA generally is provided by Lynda J. Oswald
& Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law
Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 259 (1992) (courts adopt traditional corporate law doctrine);
an equally compelling treatment of the underlying theory of CERCLA is provided by
Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA:
A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 65, 146 (1992) (proper factors
not being considered in CERCLA litigation); see also ANDREW H. PERELLIS & MARY E.
DOOHAN, SUPERFUiD LmoArION: Tit ELEMENTS AND SCOPE OF Lmmtrry, m ENVIRON-
MENTAL LITIOATION, I (Janet S. Kole & Larry D. Espel eds., 1991) (reviewing officer,
successor and shareholder liability); Percy L. Angelo & Lynn L. Bergeson, The Expand-
ing Scope of Liability for Environmental Damage and Its Impact on Business Transac-
tions, 8 CORP. L. Rav. 101, 106 (1985) (parties not engaged in generation, treatment or
disposal of hazardous waste may be liable for environmental damages); George W. Dent,
Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 151, 178 (1991)
(proposing "reasonable prudence" liability standard, where caution should be exercised
to the point where costs of additional caution outweigh benefits).
See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990);
Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990); Colorado
v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990); Mobay Corp. v. Allied Signal,
Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 (D. N.J. 1991); United States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11695 (N.D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp.
1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re
Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
Little, supra note 5, at 1499.
See generally Elizabeth A. Glass, The Modern Snake in the Grass: An Exami-
nation of Real Estate & Commercial Liability Under Superfund & Sara and Suggested
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primarily on United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc. ,9 a recent
First Circuit decision relecting what appears to be the dominant
case law, this Note investigates the evolving influence of envi-
ronmental law on the law of business assocations.
II. CERCLA As SAVIOR: RESOLVING THE HAZARDOUS WASTE
DILEMMA
By taking up where the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)' ° leaves off, CERCLA attempts to provide the
federal government with the tools necessary for a
prompt and effective response to the problems of national
magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal [and to
ensure] that those responsible for problems caused by the
disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility
for remedying the harmful conditions they created."
Foremost among its contributions, CERCLA established a $1.6
billion "Superfund" to finance removal of hazardous waste
from disposal sites and remediation of such sites.' 2 By drawing
on this fund, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) theoretically gains the resources to enact removal and
remedial programs, or to support the activities of private parties
to resolve the hazardous waste disposal problem.
In implementation, however, the Act has acquired a well
deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted provisions and an indef-
inite, if not contradictory, legislative history.'3 Despite the "mea-
Guidelines for the Practioner, 14 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 381, 386 (1987) (reviewing
contractual releases, insurance, environmental auditing, reduced purchase fees, and "as
is" contracts).
I United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D. R.I. 1989), aff'd
910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , Ill S.Ct. 957.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)(regulating only operations of hazardous waste
facilities); see generally United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
1 Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst
Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 1100, 1112
(D. Minn. 1982)); see also United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 622 (D. N.H.
1988); H.R. REP. No. 253 (111), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE & ADMIN. NEws 30380.
,1 "Response" costs are (a) "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred"
and (b) "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any .. .person." CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9706(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
'1 United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985).
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ger" legislative history, 4 Congress seems to have deliberately
left politically sensitive issues relating to liability for the courts
to resolve using common law principles;" recognizing that a
state-level response to interstate pollution would be inadequate
by any measure.
6
Fundamental to CERCLA was the goal of making private
parties rather than taxpayers responsible for clean up costs.', As
provided by the Act in general, liability for the costs of hazard-
ous waste clean-up attaches to four groups: (1) current owners
or operators of hazardous waste facilities, (2) owners or opera-
tors of such facilities at the time of the waste disposal, (3)
hazardous waste generators that arranged for disposal of their
wastes at the facility, and (4) transporters of the hazardous
substances for disposal at the facility selected by them.'8 "Owner
or operator" is defined "in the case of an onshore facility or
an offshore facility, [as] any person owning or operating such
facility."' 9 "Person" includes an "individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership ... [or] commercial entity ....
To hold a party liable as a generator of hazardous wastes
under CERCLA, a successful plaintiff must establish four ele-
ments: (1) the defendant disposed of hazardous substances, (2)
at a facility which contains hazardous substances of the sort
disposed of by the defendant ("generator"), (3) which amounted
" Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 859 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). The standard history is provided by Frank P.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
" Although standard of liability was left unaddressed, courts settled on strict,
joint and several liability. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805
(S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Healy, supra note 5, at 65.
11 In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB
Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987) (Congress did not intend ability of the
executive to fund the clean up of hazardous waste sites should depend on the attitudes
of the several states toward parent-subsidiary liability in general, or CERCLA in partic-
ular).
"7 Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986) ("persons
who bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal [should] also bear the costs of cleaning
it up").
11 CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
,9 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A); but cf. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp.
1484, 1488-89 (D. Colo. 1985) (common law analogies necessary to interpret "opera-
tor")).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
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to a release of that or some other type of hazardous substance,
and (4) the disposal causes the incurrence of response costs." A
responsible party is strictly, jointly and severally liable not only
for costs incurred in the remedial actions, but also for damages
to or loss of natural resources.22 According to recent case law,
where CERCLA seeks to impose liability beyond the corporate
entity, an individual's power to control the practice and policy
of the corporation, and the responsibility undertaken by that
individual in this area should be considered." Embracing this
philosophy, liability is founded thus on responsibility, not fault.
24
A finding of potential responsiblity under section 107(a) is
subject only to the defenses set forth in section 107(b): (1) acts
of God, (2) acts of war, and (3) third party defenses. 25 Yet the
third party defense is quite limited in practice. Namely, the third
party must be soley responsible for the waste discharge, no
contract can exist between the third party and the defendant,
and the defendant must act with "due care" to prevent a haz-
ardous release.2 6 Since CERCLA's provisions apply retroactively,
defendants cannot rely on this defense; 27 nor can they embrace
a "lack of knowledge" defense.2"
Typically the most troublesome issues of CERCLA liability
surface in one of several forms: individual corporate officer
liability,2 9 lender liability,30 successor liability,3 post-bankruptcy
2, CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3); see also United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
22 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
.2 Kelley ex rel. Natural Res. Comm'n v. Arco Indus. Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1214,
1219 (W.D. Mich. 1989); see also infra Parts IV and V.
" Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D. Vt. 1988).
21 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added); see also Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (detailing third party
defense).
16 CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
2' See, e.g., United States v. Northeast Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S...., 108 S.Ct. 146 (1987) [hereinafter NEP-
PACO].
United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626 (D. N.H. 1988).
See, e.g., Harold J. Cronk & Pat Huddleston, 11, Comment, Corporate Officer
Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What are the Consequences? 38 MERCER L.
REV. 677, 677 (1987) (environmental legislation erodes a traditional incentive for incor-
poration-limited liability); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 270-294 (summarizing
officer liability).
10 See, e.g., Scott Wilsdon, Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims
Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGs L. J. 1261, 1262 (1987)
1991-921
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liability,32 or shareholder liability.33 Corporate officer liability
proved to be the most contentious issue soon after enactment of
the Act,34 but recent case law appears to center more on succes-
sor liability, 5 while recent legal scholarship seems to focus pri-
marily on lender liability.
36
III. KAYSER-ROTH As DOMINANT PARENT-SUBSIDIARY CASE
LAW?
Concentrating on parent-subsidiary liability only, Kayser-
Roth represents the dominant approach in a "developing area
(foreclosing lender may be exposed to liability beyond value of loan or security); Sean
P. Madden, Note, Will the CERCLA Be Unbroken? Repairing the Damage After Fleet
Factors, 59 FOrtDnAt L. REV. 135 (1990) (secured-creditor exemption replete with am-
biguity); see also Rashby, supra note 5, (summarizing lender liability).
31 See, e.g., L. De-Wayne Layfield, Note, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the
Federal Common Law: Responding to an Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEx. L. REv.
1237, 1271 (1990) (successor liability should apply only to mergers and consolidations,
or to void fradulent avoidance); David C. Clarke, Note, Successor Liability Under
CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Aproach, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1300, 1333 (1990)
(traditional state law governing liability of potential responsible parties frustrates recovery
of response costs, hampers federal efforts to replenish Superfund, and slows federal
response to hazardous conditions at other sites).
11 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Liability for Hazardous Waste Clean Up: An
Examination of New Jersey's Approach, 13 HAsv. ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 300-301 (1989)
(reviewing New Jersey's success in liability determinations).
31 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Geltman, Shareholder Liability for Improper Disposal
of Hazardous Waste, 95 CoM. L. J. 385 (1990) (examining Rule lOb-5 and Racketteer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act "RICO"); Kathryn Heidt, Liability of Share-
holders under the Comprehensive Env3, 178-192 (1991) (judicial and legislative decision
making must center on "degree of control"); Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Liability of Cor-
porations and Corporate Officers. Directors, and Shareholders Under Superfund: Should
Corporate and Agency Law Concepts Apply?, 14 J. CORP. LAW. 839, 864 (1989)
(entrepreneurs confront nearly impossible task when contemplating substantial investment
or employment under current CERCLA formulations); Note, Liability of Parent Cor-
porations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986)
(analyzing economic effects of limited liability); see also supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
34 See, e.g., NEPPACO, supra note 27; Vermont v. Staco Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822
(D. Vt. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); see
generally Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
11 See, e.g., Anspec v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991);
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681
F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987).
11 Rashby, supra note 5; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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of law." '37 Applying the traditional doctrine of limited liability
of corporations and interpreting specific provisions of CERCLA,
the district court in Kayser-Roth3" imposed liability on the parent
for the CERCLA sins of its subsidiary, while the First Circuit
affirmed on a "statutory approach" alone.39 At the other end
of the spectrum, reflecting perhaps a more staunch adherence to
limited liability for parent corporations, was In Re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor Profeedings,40 decided by the
Massachusetts District Court and the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co..4
A. Stamina Mills Adopts a New Cleaning Technique
In Kayser-Roth,42 the Kayser-Roth corporation appealed a
Rhode Island district court ruling holding it liable as both an
"operator" and an "owner" for a spill of trichioroethylene
(TCE) at its subsidiary's, Stamina Mills, plant.43 The question
posed by the district court was "whether the sins of the son
should be visited upon the father.""
The facts of the case typify the connection between corporate
strategy and modern-day merger tactics. In 1965, Colonial Cor-
poration of America, owner of Stamina Mills, the nominal owner
of the TCE spill, merged with Kayser-Roth. Kayser-Roth thus
remained the sole stockholder of Stamina Mills until its disso-
lution on December 31, 1977. Like many other firms in the same
line of business during this period, Stamina Mills used a soap
scouring system to remove oil and dirt from newly woven fab-
11 United States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11695, *2 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (a majority of published opinions addressing issue of parent corporation and
individual shareholder liability under CERCLA have found imposition of liability ap-
propriate).
" United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
' United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32
(D. Mass. 1987) (denounces principle of extending liability to corporate shareholders by
"piercing the corporate veil," regardless of the statute's importance).
4 Joslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988),
aff'd, 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (in Joslyn, the court held that "... the corporate
form, including limited liability for shareholders, is a doctrine firmly entrenched in
American jurisprudence that may not be disregarded absent a specific congressional
directive").
" United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24(1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,- U.S.
I ItI S.Ct. 957.
41 Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 15.
Id. at 17.
1991-921
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
rics, but in March 1969 implemented the TCE system to improve
the process. Later, management at the mill, confronting spills
as it installed and implemented the TCE system, deposited the
waste in on-site landfills adjacent to the plant.
B. Kayser-Roth's Statutory Liability Under CERCLA 's
"'Operator" Provision: The First Circuit's Only Issue
Unlike the district court in Kayser-Roth,41 the First Circuit
decision concentrated only on the specific CERCLA provisions
necessary to impose liability on Kayser-Roth for the Stamina
Mills hazardous waste spill and subsequent disposal. For the
First Circuit, the first question was whether a parent can be held
liable as an ."operator." 46 Following the lead of the district
court, the court found few problems in doing so, holding that
Congress, by including a liability category in addition to owner
("operators") connected by the conjunction "or," implied that
a person who is an operator of a facility is not protected from
liability by the legal structure of ownership ... [tihe legislative
history provides no indication that Congress intended "all
persons" who are "operators" to exclude parent corpora-
tions. 47
Supporting this analysis, the court reasoned, were decisions ad-
dressing "operators" in other contexts, particularly those estab-
lishing personal liability for corporate officers under CERCLA.41
Since "the majority shareholder of a corporation had been held
individually liable as an "operator" under CERCLA, ' ' 49 in par-
ticular, nothing prevented a parent corporation from being held
liable for its subsidiary's activities in the same fashion.
Having decided a parent corporation could be an operator
under CERCLA, the question then became whether Kayser-Roth
was actually the operator. The court decided after its review of
traditional corporate law doctrine 0 that, in most circumstances,
the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary would not be classified
"1 See infra Part III.C.
" CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
"' Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26.
" Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26-27 (citing NEPPACO, 810 F.2d at 743-44. (indi-
vidual liability established under § 9607(a)(3))).
" Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27 (quoting New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759




as the operator of its subsidiary. In fact, in order to be classified
as an operator, more than mere ownership or control of the
subsidiary must be shown. Rather, the minimum requirement is
that the parent corporation actively participate in the ongoing
activities of its subsidiary."
Adopting the district court's analysis in full, the First Circuit
found "Kayser-Roth . . . exerted practical[ly] total influence and
control over Stamina Mills' operations.''52 The evidence was
compelling. According to the First Circuit, Kayser-Roth's control
of the company was measured by:
1) its total monetary control including collection of accounts
payable; 2) its restriction on Stamina Mills' financial budget;
3) its directive that subsidiary-government contact, including
environmental matters, be funneled directly through Kayser-
Roth; 4) its requirement that Stamina Mills' leasing, buying
or selling of real estate first be approved by Kayser-Roth;
5) its policy that Kayser-Roth approve any capital transfer or
expenditures greater than $5000; and finally, its placement of
Kayser-Roth personnel in almost all Stamina Mills' director
and officer positions, as a means of totally ensuring that
Kayser-Roth corporate policy was exactly implemented and
precisely carried out."
This type of control was more than adequate to impose liability
on the parent corporation under CERCLA.' 4 The court reiterated
the CERCLA standard of strict liability once a defendant met
the requirements of an "operator," as it rejected the corpora-
tion's argument that it was blameless for the spill."5 Finding the
"somnolent village of Forestdale, Rhode Island . . . a victim of
its own hospitality,' ' 6 the court held Kayser-Roth liable for
$846,492.33 .57
C. Twin Considerations Of Ownership And "Piercing the
Corporate Veil".- The District Court's Analysis
The First Circuit refused to consider Kayser-Roth's liability
as an "owner;" such consideration being unnecessary once "op-
51 Id.
'2 Id.
Id. (quoting Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 18).
54 Id.
"1 The third party defense did not apply because Stamina Mills and Kayser-Roth
were contractually related. 910 F.2d. at 27.
Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 16-17.
17 Id. at 24-25.
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erator" liability was established. 8 For the district court, how-
ever, the issue of determining liability under the "owner"
provision of CERCLA provided the more challenging legal ques-
tion. Here, unlike courts before it, the district court examined
the tension between CERCLA statutory language and traditional
concepts of limited liability for the corporation. 9
It was not the court, but the government that injected both
issues into the case when it sought to recover its cleanup costs
based on direct liability (Kayser-Roth as "operator" of the site)
and indirect liability (Kayser-Roth as owner by "piercing the
corporate veil").60 Because Stamina-Mills was the "alter ego"
of Kayser-Roth, a party potentially liable under CERCLA, the
government alleged the corporate veil between the two, as par-
ent-subsidiary, should be pierced.6' Invoking traditional concepts
of corporate law, attorneys for the Kayser-Roth corporation
argued conversely that the parent of a dissolved subsidiary can-
not, as a matter of law, be held liable on either ground.62
For the district court, piercing the veil to attach CERCLA
liability was a species of owner, rather than operator, liability.
63
Imputing liability by piercing the corporate veil was in effect
concluding that the parent was an owner for CERCLA pur-
poses. 64 Yet in confronting a long line of precedent, the district
court in Kayser-Roth was reluctant to pierce the veil, noting that
ordinarily a parent corporation cannot be deemed an operator
based soley upon its status as shareholder.
65
The district court's hesitation to pierce the veil was well
founded. Ordinarily, courts disregard the separate legal identity
of a corporation and hold shareholders liable for the corpora-
Kayser-Roih, 910 F.2d at 28, n.lI.
Deciding this case required "not only a journey through the labyrinth of the
[CERCLA], but thorough examination of the relationship between the related corpora-
tion as well." Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp at 18-20.
o Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 25.
61 Id.
62 During oral arguments, the company plead alternatively the spill was an "acci-
dent" and thus not a "disposal," but the court quickly dismissed this, noting that
"spilling" is explicitly part of CERCLA, citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). Kayser-Roth, 910
F.2d. at 26, n.2.
63 Id. at 23.
" The court concluded while an owner may be, in most cases, an operator, the
converse was not true. Id. at 23.
65 Id. at 22.
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tion's acts only under a narrow range of circumstances.6 As a
general rule, the corporate veil will not be pierced unless cor-
porate formalities are substantially ignored, initial financing is
grossly inadequate, or the corporate purpose is simply to evade
existing obligations. 67 Courts view the issue as a matter of equity
and ask whether failure to pierce the corporate veil would be
unjust or unfair under the circumstances.6
Given the situation at hand, the district court decided, Kay-
ser-Roth should be held liable under CERCLA for Stamina
Mills' TCE release.6 9 As the court decided, "Stamina Mills' veil
should be pierced to hold Kayser-Roth liable, not only because
public convenience, fairness, and equity dictated such a result,
but because of the encompassing control that Kayser-Roth held
over Stamina Mills as, in fact and deed, an owner." 70 In so
holding the court embraced a federal common law approach,7"
citing the goal of reducing the nationwide public health and
environmental problem CERCLA was intended to resolve, and
"beneficial legislative purposes.1 72 As it underscored the impor-
tance of the hazardous waste problem, the court suggested
"CERCLA places no special importance upon the corporate
structure." 7  The district court held Kayser-Roth, as a parent
corporation, liable in two ways for its subsidiary's environmental
crimes: as an "operator" and as "owner.
74
Earlier courts developed various tests of parent-subsidiary
liability, but ignored the operator-owner distinction made clear
- On this topic generally, see ROBERT HAmITON, CORPORAIONS INCLUDING PART-
NERSMnPS AND L rraoD PARTNERSHIPS, ch. 6 (4th ed., 1990). A classic description is given
in Dewitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686-87 (4th Cir.
1976) (identifying failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends,
insolvency of debtor corporation, siphoning of funds, and nonfunctioning of officers).
67 HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 258.
Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26-27.
69 Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 24.
7o Id. at 23.
' Courts have developed a laundry list of items used to determine when and if a
veil should be pierced. These concepts have been invoked by "all participants in the
litigation: by courts in their analysis and decision making; by plaintiffs in pleading the
cause of action; or by defendants in arguments to avoid liability." Wallace, supra note
33, at 848 (footnotes omitted); Joslyn Corp. v. T. L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222,
227 (W.D. La. 1988) (reviewing these criteria).
72 Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23.
71 Id. at 24 (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D. N.H.
1988).
7 724 F. Supp. 15 (D. R.I. 1989).
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in Kayser-Roth. In Idaho v. Bunker Hill,7 for example, the
court held the Gulf Corporation, the non-resident parent of the
offending Bunker Hill (later Pintlar) Company, subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction as a result of the activities of its resident
subsidiary. 7 Gulf could thus be held liable. Bunker Hill held a
literal reading of the statute indicates that a person who owns
an interest in a facility and actively participates in its manage-
ment can be held liable for disposal of hazardous waste.
77
Evidence of control was clear in this case. Approval by Gulf
was necessary before more than $500 could be spent on pollution
matters and before capital expenditures could be made; weekly
reports of day-to-day activities were required by Gulf.78 Bunker
Hill's authorized capital was a mere $1,100 while Gulf received
$27 million in dividends from Bunker Hill.79 On these facts Gulf
was held liable for the Bunker Hill spill, although the court
admitted that "care must be taken so that 'normal' activities of
a parent with respect to its subsidiaries do not automatically
warrant finding the parent an owner or operator.''80 An "ability
to control" test was thus adopted by Bunker Hill for determining
parent-subsidiary liability under CERCLA.
Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp." is
a third case addressing CERCLA parent-subsidiary liability. In
this case, the Rockwell corporation sought to hold IU Interna-
tional liable for an illegal disposal by its subsidiary, Hills-
McCanna (Byevalve). Concluding that mere ability to exercise
control as a result of any financial relationship of the parties
was insufficient for liability to attach, the Rockwell court held
the entity must "actually exercise control." '82 When IU stated
publicly it "operated" the facility with its appointees in charge,
its fate was sealed with respect to liability-disposal clean-up
was its responsibility.83 Despite the "potential to control" and
"actual control" tests for parent-subsidiary liability, neither
Bunker Hill nor Rockwell kept "owner" separate from "oper-
,1 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
16 Id. at 671-672.
7 Id. (quoting NEPPACO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-849).
11 Id. at 672.
9Id.
Id.
" 702. F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. IUt. 1988).
82 Id.
13 Id. at 1391.
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ator,"' and neither addressed standards for holding an "owner"
liable under CERCLA.
IV. PIERCING THE OWNER'S VEIL: JOSLYN AND IN RE
ACUSHNET
The relevance of Kayser-Roth becomes apparent only when
compared with Joslyn85 and In Re Acushnet.8 6 The court in
Joslyn considered the liability for a creosoting plant clean-up in
Bossier City, Louisiana, operated by Lincoln Creosoting Com-
pany. Formed in 1935 with the majority of stock owned by the
T.L. James Company since 1950, Lincoln sold the plant to
Joslyn who owned it until Koppers purchased it in 1969. Two
years later Koppers sold it to several property owners. Having
to incurr several million dollars in clean-up costs, Joslyn argued
the James Company was liable for the costs of the clean-up
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) as an "owner or operator." Ap-
pellant Joslyn urged the court to follow the Second Circuit,
which extended CERCLA liability to parents."
Rejecting this recommendation, the Joslyn court relieved the
James Company of liability, holding that CERCLA defines nei-
ther "owner" nor "operator" as including the parent company
of an offending wholly owned subsidiary. 8 Seemingly, the court
embraced a strict "pierce the corporate veil" approach, 9 refus-
ing to dilute the limited liability of parent corporations:
[Tlhe legislative history [does not] indicate that Congress in-
tended to alter so substantially a basic tenet of corporation
law. "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must ...
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if
it is plain ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
For example, the Bunker Hill court concluded:
a parent's involvement in the management and operations of a subsidiary,
which was subject to personal jurisdiction as a result, supported the con-
clusion that the parent was an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA.
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1986) (emphasis added).
Joslyn Corp. v. T. L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (Sth Cir. 1990).
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D.
Mass. 1987).
87 Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 82 (quoting New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F.Supp 615 (D. N.H. 1988); Vermont v. Staco,
684 F. Supp. 822(D. Vt. 1988); Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665).
Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83.
8gId.
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according to its terms . . . ." Joslyn asks this court to rewrite
the language of the Act significantly and hold parents directly
liable for their subsidiaries' activities. To do so would dra-
matically alter traditional concepts of corporation law ....
Any bold rewriting of corporation law in this area is best left
to Congress.90
The court held further that "[v]eil piercing should be limited to
situations in which the corporate entity is used as a sham to
perpetuate a fraud or avoid personal liability." 9' The district
court simply found "no proof that James Company had com-
plete domination of finances, policies and practices to cause
Lincoln to be not a separate business entity but a mere conduit
of James Company.' '92 A provision disregarding decades of cor-
porate law would not be read into the statute by the court.9 3
Conspicuous by its absence in Joslyn was any indication of the
James Corporation's "operAtor" liability.
In Re Acushnet9 was a similar case. Here, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts filed separate complaints against six
corporate defendants for a spill of polychlorinated biphenyls.
The state argued the corporate veil of Aerovox, one of the
defendants, should be pierced to assert jurisdiction over the RTE
corporation, its parent. Invoking a traditional common law ap-
proach to veil piercing, the In Re Acushnet court refused to
hold the parent liable, concluding "a corporation which wants
to put a waste site or past generation site to productive use can
do so by creating a well capitalized, non-fradulent separate
corporate subsidiary." 95 The court held further there was "noth-
ing fradulent or against public policy in limiting one's liability
by the appropriate use of corporate insulation."'' Describing the
Aerovox-RTE relationship, the court concluded a centralized
cash management system was not intermingling of funds and
Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted).
9 Id. at 83.
92 Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 232 (emphasis added).
9 Reviewing the well established maximum that incorporation limits personal
liability, the Joslyn district court concluded "neither the clear language of CERCLA
nor its legislative history provides authority for imposing individual liability on corporate
officers or direct liability on parent coporations." 696 F. Supp. at 226.
675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
" In re Acushnet, 675 F. Supp. at 32.
Id. at 34 (quoting Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 773 (lst Cir.
[VOL. 7:293
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY LIrrIuIy
shareholder control of significant expenditures was not a disre-
gard for corporate separateness. 97 Aerovox negotiated its own
contracts, developed its own customers, arranged its own loans,
developed its own budgets, hired and fired its own employees,
and maintained its own records and accounts.98 None of these
circumstances suggested any "wrong that equity's hand must
right." 99 In answering the pleas of the petitioner, the In Re
Acushnet court concluded "[ilf limited liability is to remain the
rule and not the exception, then this generally accepted structure
ought not to be torn down absent statutory authorization." 10
As in Joslyn, this court's analysis did not turn on CERCLA's
"operator" language.
V. MAKING SENSE OF PARENT-SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA
A. Reconciling Kayser-Roth, Joslyn, and In Re Acushnet
The Kayser-Roth district court viewed Joslyn as a case of
"owner" liability, not "owner or operator" liability.' 0' Deciding
in no uncertain terms, the court concluded "Kayser is being held
liable for its activities as an operator, not the activities of a
subsidiary.'1 2 By comparision, the court reasoned in Joslyn
there was no participation by the parent in the activities of the
subsidiary.10
Few seem to agree with the Kayser-Roth court's analysis of
Joslyn. For example, several critics argue Kayser-Roth cannot
withstand scrutiny in comparision to Joslyn and should be re-
jected by other courts.104 One analyst maintains Kayser-Roth
0 Id. at 34-35.
a Id. at 35.
" Id. at 34.
0 Id. at 35.
10, Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27.
1o Id. (emphasis in original).
101 Id. (quoting Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prod., 1990 WL
72249, 1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6375 (E.D. La. 1990)).
' Cindy A. Wolfer, Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil Under CERCLA: To
Control or Not to Control- Which is The Answer?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 975, 998 (1991)
(future of corporate law best served by Joslyn); Little, supra note 5, at 1513-14 (Joslyn
withstands scrutiny, would serve to reduce uncertainty, and should be adopted by the
courts); Perellis & Doohan, supra note 5, at 8-9 (Joslyn may signal a trend back towards
"traditional corporate law principles").
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stands for the total "disregard [of the] principles of corporate
separateness and impose[s] CERCLA liability directly upon the
parent corporation . . . despite the absence of any statutory or
common law basis."' 0 One court even concluded Joslyn and
Kayser-Roth reached "divergent conclusions."' 106 Others suggest
the question in these cases is whether to "adhere to the tradi-
tional corporate common law rule strictly limiting alter ego
liability, or instead to look beyond the formalites of separate
corporate existence and impose direct CERCLA liability on par-
ent corporations and individual shareholders." 0 7 Still others take
this a step further and suggest environmental legislation, like
CERCLA, has altogether "eroded" a traditional incentive for
incorporation-limited liability, 0° while a few advise adoption
of a federal common law approach violates the constitutional
distinction between state and federal power.' °9 In Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., the court opined CERCLA changed the
entire landscape of corporate law.110
B. Strengthening Limited Liability For The Corporation
Kayser-Roth, however, represents no such dilution of the
traditional concepts of corporate law, and statements to this
effect only characterize the decision, and even the Joslyn hold-
ing, unfairly. The two cases are more alike than different. For
example, the Kayser-Roth court would have reached the same
result as the Joslyn court, which, given its facts, invoked a more
10' Little, supra note 5, at 1500.
0 Mobay v. Allied-Signal Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 352 (D. N.J. 1991).
1' Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for
Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U. S. F. L. REv. 421, 435-436
(1990).
101 See Wolfer, supra note 104, at 1000 (traditional principles rejected); McMahon
& Moertl, supra note 5 (traditional principles rejected); but cf. Oswald & Schipani, supra
note 5, at 315 (traditional corporate principles apply).
L09 Ken Purviance, Note, The Hazardous Waste Abatement Liability of Innocent
Landowners: A Constitional Analysis, 17 PAC. L. J. 185, 211 (1985) ("filmposing liability
on innocent landowners runs counter to the constitutional guarantee that land cannot
be taken for a public purpose without just compensation").
110 The Kelley court held: CERCLA statutory scheme varies the configuration of
traditional corporate principles which prevent individual liability absent a conclusion
that an individual engaged in procedural irregularities justifying a court in "piercing of
the corporate veil," or that an individual has had a close, active involvement or direct
supervision in the events leading to the alleged tortious harm. 727 F. Supp. at 1542.
[VOL. 7:293
1991-92] PARENT-SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY
explicit limited liability for the corporation approach.", Con-
versely, the Joslyn court would have reached the same result as
in Kayser-Roth. Even if it were to adopt an "operator" analysis
of liability in place of its "owner" investigation, the Joslyn
court clearly would not have held the T.L. James & Company.
liable for the creosote clean up. Lincoln, the subsidiary in Joslyn,
faithfully adhered to basic corporate formalities by keeping its
own financial records and by holding frequent shareholder and
directors meetings." 2 Daily operations were entirely separate. 3
Support for this proposition-that the Joslyn result would be
similar to the Kayser-Roth decision-was given by the district
court itself.1"
4
Contrary to other interpretations,"' while both cases ulti-
mately define the legal link between parent and subsidiary, nei-
ther forges a new connection contrary to traditional corporate
law. Both hold that who controls should ultimately pay. For the
Joslyn court, since the James Company had virtually no control
"I For one analyst, the Kayser-Roth approach, imposing direct liability under
CERCLA, is perfectly consistent not only with CERCLA but with limited liability as
well, if justified by the facts of individual cases. Arnovsky and Fuller, supra note 107,
at 461; see also Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 315 (limited liability doctrine still
in effect).
12 Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 83.
1' Id.
1" In dicta, the Joslyn district court noted:
this court would have likely reached the same result under applicable
corporate law at least in [United States v.] Conservation Chemical [619 F.
Supp. 162, (W.D. Mo. 1985)], Mottolo and Shore Realty. These cases
involved factual situations where the personal participation in the illegal
disposal of hazardous waste by the corporate officers was significant ...
"these courts have avoided the common law rule of limited liability by
either explicitly or implicitly applying a generally recognized exception: a
corporate officer is liable for the wrongful acts of a corporation when he
personally participates in the wrongful conduct" . . . [I]f T.L. James &
Company and its officers and directors had been actively involved in the
day-to-day operations of Lincoln, including the disposal of hazardous
wastes, then, arguably, liability would attach.
696 F. Supp. at 232-233, n.20 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., Wolfer, supra note 104, at 998 (Joslyn more in line with principles
that underlie privilege of limited liability); Allen Kezsbom, Anthony Satula & Alan
Goldman, "Successor" and "Parent" Liability for Superfund Liability Costs: The
Evolving State of Law, 10 VA. ENvmt. L. J. 45, 60-61 (1990) (Joslyn "rejected" control-
based analysis of hazardous waste liability); see also Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note
107 at 450-451 (1990) (no single standard can be distilled from cases decided to date);
Little, supra note 5, at 1499 (in Kayser-Roth "courts have taken a haphazard approach,
often mangling the language of the statute, and at times importing common law notions
of liability, while at other times wholly discarding these same notions").
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over the subsidiary, it would be unjust to hold the parent cor-
poration responsible for its subsidiary's liabilities. A parent's
iron grip on the subsidiary was the bottom line in Kayser-Roth.
Holding the parent corporation in that case directly liable for
the Stamina Mills' spill was appropriate because; (1) the corpo-
ration "operated" the site, (2) CERCLA language allowed it,
and (3) any company that ultimately received the benefits now
had to endure the pain.
By clarifying the distinction between "operator" and
"owner," the Kayser-Roth court reaffirmed, and indeed actually
strengthened, the limited liability premise of corporations. Yet
the court went beyond simply applying "traditional" corporate
law concepts, namely in settling the choice of law issue. When
the court embraced a federal common law approach, it stan-
dardized an analytical approach necessary to identify "poten-
tially responsible parties" under the Act. Analysts attempting to
understand parent-subsidiary law cannot look to the situs state
for law, but must, after Kayser-Roth, consider any differences,
however slight they may be, in the federal common law ap-
proach' 16 Still, the most important contribution of the Kayser-
Roth district court was not that it imposed "liability on a parent
company by piercing the corporate veil of the subsidiary."
'"17
Rather, the contribution comes in providing clear case law that
illustrates the application of corporate law to interpret an envi-
ronmental statute. It holds an owner liable under CERCLA and
illustrates application of the statutory language in holding a
company liable as an operator. Left unaddressed by the court,
however, was whether a corporation can have more than one
owner"-an issue expected to grow as corporations diversify at
home and abroad.
Ultimately, the Kayser-Roth court recognized that if, as the
plaintiffs argued in many of these cases, mere creation of a
I But cf. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 5, at 315 ("liability of a parent corpo-
ration is the same regardless of whether liability is premised on traditional corporate
law or direct statutory liability"); Wolfer, supra note 104, at 1000 (federal courts should
follow established standards for piercing); but see Clarke, supra note 3 1, at 1333 (federal
common law implements congressional intent fully); see generally supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
For analysis in this vein, see Wolfer, supra note 103, at 991.
"' Little, supra note 5, at 1511, n. 72 ("Kayser-Roth appears to stand for the
proposition that, while there can only be one owner of a facility at any given time, there
can be any number of operators").
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separate corporate entity could insulate against CERCLA liabil-
ity, then it would be far too easy to evade the statute. Judging
from the result reached by the court in Kayser-Roth, if a parent
can be held liable as an "operator" under CERCLA's liability
scheme, then the parent will probably fulfill the standards nec-
essary to "pierce its veil." But if a parent is simply an owner,
without the applicable standards being met for an operator, the
decision suggests liability will not attach. No doubt Congress
intended to cast a broad net of liability across all parties asso-
ciated with hazardous waste sites, but the holding in Kayser-
Roth demonstrates the corporate veil still shields shareholders
from the corporation's liabilities when the parent is not to blame
and not pulling the strings of the subsidiary. Set within the
framework of federal common law, in other words, Kayser-Roth
blends the "potential to control" test of Bunker-Hill and the
"actual control" test of Rockwell for the imposition of liability
under CERCLA's operator provision." 9 According to one recent
court, such an approach facilitates fast, efficient, equitable clean
up of hazardous waste sites. 20
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, CERCLA's liability framework, developed both
in the statute itself and in recent interpretations by several courts,
deals with the question of who will pay for the residual effects
of economic growth. For the Kayser-Roth court, those benefiting
from the waste should pay for it. In so holding, the court decided
any distinction between direct CERCLA liability, imposed
through the statutory definition of "operator", and piercing the
corporate veil of the "owner," using any number of theories,
often amounts to an "operator" analysis. As made clear both
in Kayser-Roth and Joslyn, the issue is not so much parent-
subsidiary form, but control, as it has been in the past-only
now with a new thrust of federal common law to set the stan-
dard. When the legal ownership of a subsidiary becomes simply
"' Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 107, at 461-462, develop a similar test, but add
"knowledge or reason to know" of the hazardous waste spill in imposing liability under
CERCLA's operator provision. They conclude "imposition of liability based on the
indirect ownership status (i.e., "owner" under CERCLA) is too great an intrusion into
the territority protected by the principle of limited liability and is not warranted by
CERCLA." Id., at 461, n. 179.
11 Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 345.
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manipulation, the parent steps into the shoes of the subsidiary
and must pay for any and all costs of CERCLA clean up.
Douglas A. Henderson
